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Practice-led Research and the Engagement with Truth 
 
Dr Malcolm Quinn 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper offers the thesis that practice-led research in art and 
design should propose changes to those relations of knowledge that 
currently ensure the integrity of practice and the neutrality and 
objectivity of theory. I assert that the ‘common ground’ of theory 
and practice can be located within a structure of identification that 
binds the practitioner to the analyst or theorist of practice. I offer 
an example of one theorist (Slavoj !i"ek) who has instituted a 
game with this structure of identification of theorist and art object, 
a game that is necessarily limited by conditions for the ‘practice of 
theory’ in the humanities. A way beyond these limitations is 
suggested in a discussion of Lars von Trier’s film The Five 
Obstructions (2004). This film makes a series of displacements of 
the integrity of practice within the forms of identification that 
structure the engagements of Lars von Trier and Jørgen Leth. 
 
Full Paper 
The most positive thing that practice-led research can do is to work 
directly on the relations of knowledge that structure the practices of 
art and design. As I will go on to show, this kind of direct 
intervention in the relations of knowledge is precisely what 
Humanities-based ‘Theory’ has shown itself unable to accomplish, 
largely because it has no thorough and consistent way of 
understanding its own structures of identification. By ‘identification’ 
I mean such things as desire, passivity, narcissism and 
ambivalence. Theory seeks out identification outside itself, in social 
and cultural objects, and particularly in the objects of art, which are 
often held up as The Big Identifier, the ultimate bait. Artists are 
often quite happy playing their role within this division of labour, in 
which art is subsumed in its identifications and theory is taken up 
with their contextualization and rationalisation. It is this relationship 
that became institutionalised in art schools following the 
Coldstream reforms of the late sixties, in which a homunculus of 
the university, the art historian or theorist, was injected into the art 
school bloodstream in the hope of raising the intellectual game. It 
can be argued that all that Coldstream succeeded in doing was 
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reinforcing the distinction between the technicians and the analysts 
of desire. An editorial in The Burlington Magazine in 1962, 
commenting on the Coldstream reforms, offered the thesis that the 
appropriationist habits of talented artists made them particularly 
unsuitable for art historical instruction: 
Every year there will be a handful of Francis Bacons 
among them [art students], to whom the contrast 
between early, and late, Poussin is always going to be a 
matter of total indifference …but who will snatch whatever 
they require – it may be a still from an early film, or a 
Piero – anywhere out of the past in order to fill some gap 
in their own fantasy world.1 
The editorial concluded that the teaching of art history in art 
schools might be best seen as the inculcation of ‘university-lite’ 
transferable skills for those government-funded mediocrities whom, 
unlike the handful of putative Francis Bacons, would end up as 
teachers and administrators. This suggested that rather than 
raising standards in art schools, Coldstream’s reforms would make 
it easier to lower the bar. The intellectualisation of art since the late 
sixties has thus resulted in an unhealthy stalemate between the 
assumption that art schools exist to deal with exceptional practices, 
and its corollary, the assumption that theory exists to bestow a 
universal culture of thinking on a number of self-sufficient divisions 
of practice in art schools. Practice-led research, however, holds out 
the possibility of treating theory and practice as a single set of 
knowledge relations and a single stream of identifications, which 
has implications that, one hopes, both practitioners and theorists 
will find irksome, gratuitous and particularly unwelcome. Students 
whose practice-led projects I am currently supervising are quite 
happy to work directly and without qualms with elements such as 
ambiguity, duration and belief as a means to investigate what 
produces knowledge within their own practice and that of others.  
For my part, I am currently leading a small AHRC-funded 
collaborative training programme in partnership with the 
Department of Psychology at Brunel University, on Psychoanalytic 
Models of Art and Performance. One of the aims of this programme 
is to use psychoanalysis to analyse the identifications of practice 
and theory from within, through a series of seminars focusing on 
elements of practice such as the act, time and the object, rather 
                                                 
1 ‘Art History in Art Schools’, anonymous editorial, The Burlington Magazine 
no.716 Nov., 1962, p.451. 
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than using psychoanalytic theory to analyse a set of discrete 
artworks.   
 
Insofar as psychoanalysis offers both the possibility of exploring 
mechanisms of identification within practice, and the possibility of 
reneging on its own patterns of identification in the name of applied 
psychoanalysis, it is apposite to use the psychoanalysis of art as an 
example of how to locate the ‘missing identifications’ of Theory and 
Anti-Theory. The example I have chosen is from Slavoj !i"ek’s book 
The Fright of Real Tears: Krzystof Kiéslowski Between Theory and 
Post-Theory.2 In this text, !i"ek pursues an ethical discourse on the 
degraded condition of contemporary cultural theory. While 
developing this line of thought, !i"ek also seems to perpetrate an 
unobtrusive hoax, which radically undermines the rigorous 
relationship between psychoanalytic interpretation and its objects 
(films, literature, world events) that has characterised his own 
philosophico-psychoanalytic method. He sets up the hoax by 
affirming his disgust at his own interpretive position:  
 
Some months before writing this, at an art round table, I 
was asked to comment on a painting I had seen there 
before for the first time. I did not have any idea about it, 
so I engaged in a total bluff, which went something like 
this: the frame of the painting in front of us is not its true 
frame, there is another, invisible frame implied by the 
structure of the painting, which frames our perception of 
the painting, and these two frames do not overlap—there 
is an invisible gap separating the two …To my surprise, 
this brief intervention was a huge success, and many 
following participants referred to the dimension-in-
between-the-two-frames, elevating it into a term.3 
 
The decisive twist comes much later in the book, when !i"ek inserts 
his own spoof of the ‘dimension-in-between-the-two-frames’, word 
for word, into an apparently serious discussion of paintings by 
Malevich, Hopper and Munch.4 It is also worth noting that !i"ek has 
repeated (or more accurately ‘re-framed’) this passage in his more 
recent book The Parallax View,5 which also refers in its introduction 
                                                 
2 !i"ek, S. The Fright of Real Tears: Krzystof Kiéslowski Between Theory and 
Post-Theory, London: BFI, 2001. 
3 !i"ek, S. ibid., p.5-6. 
4 !i"ek, S. ibid., p.130. 
5 !i"ek, S. The Parallax View, Cambridge-MA: MIT Press, 2006. 
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to ‘cruel traps …set here and there throughout the book’.6 With his 
riddle of the frames, !i"ek captures both the problems of the 
theorist and those of the anti-theorist – while we warm the cockles 
of our hearts at the gullibility of those at the art round table, we are 
ourselves drawn deeper into the trap, as we accept the rhetoric of 
truth and enlightenment his anti-theoretical parable offers. Anti-
theory nearly always offers a moment of moral re-armament and 
enlightenment, and sets us on our guard against the immoral 
machinations of the theorist, who is generally portrayed as a 
huckster or charlatan, trading in shoddy intellectual goods. An 
exchange of letters on the subject of continental philosophy in the 
Guardian7 in May 2006, which rehearsed the tired debate over 
Jacques Derrida’s honorary degree at Cambridge, showed that anti-
theoretical discourse in Britain, like campaigns against ‘tenured 
radicals’ in the USA, is still with us. Specific attacks on theory in 
academia have gained fresh impetus from their association with a 
more recent discourse against political ‘spin’. Yet !i"ek shows that 
the anti-theorist should be careful. The second occasion on which 
!i"ek’s device of the ‘dimension-in-between-the-two-frames’ 
appears in The Fright of Real Tears, locates both theorist and anti-
theorist within the same space, in which there is a kind of barter or 
negotiation taking place over the quality of goods within a set of 
relations between producers and consumers, in a marketplace of 
ideas. For a moment at least, his hoax places !i"ek himself in quite 
another space, clearly beyond the pale, in which he has voided the 
social contract between writer and reader that supports the 
exchange of knowledge. Scandalously, !i"ek has gone to the roots 
of knowledge in instances of identification composed of desire, 
passivity, narcissism and ambivalence, and raised the tentative 
possibility that his entire oeuvre might be merely a cruel joke on 
the reader’s wish for intellectual satisfaction. !i"ek’s hoax seems to 
be an anti-intellectual gesture, yet, if we accept his stated position 
on the problems of cultural theory, it also seems to be concerned 
with the ethical positioning of truth. Is truth a matter of intellectual 
contest, free debate, the wresting of one’s opponents in the free 
exchange of knowledge? Or does truth appear within the separation 
or displacement of those moments of identification that glue social 
relations of knowledge together? In !i"ek’s story of the art round 
table and the deception that follows it, art is the bait that situates 
the theorist and the anti-theorist within their tug-of-war over truth 
– but art can also be that which promises to pull their mutual 
                                                 
6 !i"ek, S. ibid., p. 11. 
7 ‘Blinded by a French Philosophical Fetish’ The Guardian, 20 April 2006, p.35. 
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identifications apart. When the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
submitted one of his last reports on the impossible task of critique 
in his book Pascalian Meditations, he made a significant choice of 
an exit strategy from the charmed circle of academic life:  
 
Being convinced that Pascal was right to say that “true 
philosophy makes light of philosophy”, I have often 
regretted that academic proprieties prevented me from 
taking this invitation literally: more than once I have 
wanted to fight the symbolic violence that is exercised, 
firstly on philosophers themselves, in the name of 
philosophy, with the weapons most commonly used to 
counteract the effects of that violence — irony, pastiche 
and parody. I envied the freedom of writers …or of the 
artists who from Duchamp to Devatour, have, in their own 
artistic practice, constantly subverted the belief in art and 
artists.8  
 
In Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu also wonders whether his critical 
work is not ‘a little perverse’ in creating a schism between himself 
and his fellow academics:  
 
When he simply does what he has to do, the sociologist 
breaks the enchanted circles of collective denial [of the 
social world by academics]. By working towards the 
‘return of the repressed’, by trying to know and make 
known what the world of knowledge does not want to 
know, especially about itself, he takes the risk of 
appearing as the one who ‘gives the game away’— but to 
whom, except to those with whom, in so doing, he breaks 
ranks …?9  
 
Despite Bourdieu’s use of psychoanalytic language to indicate 
epistemological radicalism, one is entitled to ask whether Bourdieu 
gives ‘the game’ away at all, since a little perversion goes a long 
way towards confirming the manners and rules of intellectual 
freedom. As Duchamp’s hoax proves, a true ‘return of the 
repressed’ does not reflect an institution or a discourse as it is in 
terms of its internal and external dispositions and historical 
trajectory, but inversely, as a thing which it cannot be on those 
                                                 
8 Bourdieu, P. Pascalian Meditations (trans. Richard Nice), Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2000, p.2. 
9 Bourdieu, P. ibid., p.5. 
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terms. Thierry de Duve has argued that the purpose of Duchamp’s 
gesture was ‘the testing of the Independents’ liberalism’ by showing 
how a discourse on freedom prohibited its actual expression.10  The 
subsequent embarrassment over the urinal exposed the difference 
between the Independents’ own historical critique of previous, less 
open submissions, and the implicit restrictions imposed by this 
historically founded notion of progress. The urinal is manifest as the 
future that has been forestalled by the supposedly forward looking 
and liberating historical reflection; it appears from within this 
historical notion of progress as its unconscious possibility — its 
failure, in fact, to be progressive. For Terry Eagleton, this trust in 
the critical power of historical reflection is the besetting sin of a 
theorist such as Frederic Jameson. In a recent review of Jameson’s 
Archaeologies of the Future11 he claims that Jameson substitutes 
judgements on things for a practice of returning them to their 
historical contexts: 
 
Grasping their historical significance, or even seeing them 
as historically inevitable, takes over from the self-
righteous rhetoric of commending or condemning them. 
Or, indeed, assessing their truth, a word which Jameson 
has now ominously begun to put in scare quotes.12 
 
For Eagleton, Jamesonian theory, ‘this great bulldozer of literary 
style’ that aims to level the intellectual landscape beneath it, has 
run into sand because of its single-minded dedication to the project 
of dissolving text into historical context, and its concomitant refusal 
to engage with an ethics of truth. However, Eagleton’s own position 
has not shifted significantly from the ‘anti-culturalist’ polemic he 
offered in The Idea of Culture.13 In that text, he took the standard 
anti-theoretical line of campaigning against types of knowledge 
producers called ‘cultural theorists’, rather than addressing the 
conditions of knowledge production itself. One suspects therefore, 
that the kinds of ‘truth’ he would like to champion in his critique of 
Jameson might be the same list of iron circumstances of the world 
such as war, famine, poverty, disease and the displacement of 
                                                 
10 De Duve, T. Kant After Duchamp, Cambridge MA-London: The MIT Press, 
1998, p.117.  
11 Eagleton, T. ‘Making a Break’ London Review of Books, vol.28, no.5 March 
2006, pp.25-6. 
12 Eagleton, T. ibid., p.26. 
13 Eagleton, T. The Idea of Culture London: Blackwell, 2000. See also Quinn, M. 
‘The Legions of the Blind’ in D. Beech and J. Roberts The Philistine Controversy, 
London: Verso 2002. 
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peoples14 that he lists in The Idea of Culture, and which he asserts 
that the elaborate fancies of cultural theory cannot reach.15 
Eagleton’s concern is with claims to truth, whereas one could say 
that, in The Fright of Real Tears, !i"ek begins to play a game with 
the truth of our identifications, or to put this another way, the 
desires that are bound up with our positions within fields of 
knowledge, and our faith in ‘end-state truth’. Ultimately, however, 
!i"ek is himself cornered by the demands of cultural theory and the 
limits of applied psychoanalysis in the free market in ideas. In 
comparison with the sustained and corrosive attack on the contract 
between the writer and the reader offered by a book such as 
Lautréamont’s Songs of Maldoror, or Sade’s One Hundred and 
Twenty Days of Sodom, his hoax is understated, and does nothing 
to trouble his reputation as a significant cultural theorist who may 
also be regarded as one of our most important anti-theorists. Only 
in The Fright of Real Tears does this balance of forces threaten to 
‘go critical’; most of the time, this pro- and anti-theoretical paradox 
fuels a textual performance that dramatises the current impasse of 
theory in the Humanities. This performance turns interpretation into 
a taunt that stretches credulity to breaking point (David Lynch is 
the key to understanding Kant; the war in the Balkans is structured 
like Hitchcock’s Rear Window, etc.), whilst issuing intermittent 
demands for a revolutionary moment that might provide an 
emancipation from the failure of interpretation, and the dissipated 
energies of Jamesonian style theory.   
 
So far, I have focused on two theoreticians of note, !i"ek and 
Bourdieu, both of whom have something to say about the problems 
of theory. In pursuing this line of thought, both use art as an 
example, in very different ways. I have suggested that !i"ek may 
be opening up the possibility of using practices of identification 
within relations of knowledge to disturb the unholy alliance of 
theory and anti-theory that drives his own textual performance and 
that of others. !i"ek’s view of art, however, is extremely simplistic, 
                                                 
14 Eagleton, T. ibid., p.130. 
15 Andrew Hemingway has taken issue with my characterisation of Terry 
Eagleton’s view of cultural studies in his review of ‘The Philistine Controversy’ 
(see note 13 above) in Historical Materialism 13(3), 2005, pp.239-29. On p.257, 
Hemingway argues that ‘Eagleton’s target is not cultural studies as such, but a 
postmodern consumerist-liberal variant of the same.’ However, in ‘Eat it!’ a piece 
in The London Review of Books 28 (11), 2006, pp.29-30, Eagleton does not 
distinguish between the academic and societal variations of culturalism, and 
demonstrates a specifically academic genealogy for the contemporary myth that 
‘Society is the new ground of being …[and] culture is the foundation impossible 
to dig beneath.’ 
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since he regards it as bait for those forms of desire, passivity, 
narcissism and ambivalence that structure our relationship to 
objects of knowledge. Bourdieu, on the other hand, knows a lot 
more about art, but has no interest in identification, and regards 
the radical practices of art as a potent but taboo alternative to his 
own reliance on rigorous methodologies of historical-critical 
reflection which, despite their rigor, are unable to accomplish the 
shift in relations of knowledge brought about by someone like 
Duchamp. In 1917, Duchamp had already shown that art could be a 
trap without simply being an aesthetic bait, in other words he had 
shown that relations of knowledge as desire can be distinguished 
from the desirable object of knowledge in the practice of art. 
!i"ek’s story of the ‘art round table’ shows us that humanities 
based theory is still unable to accomplish this kind of displacement 
in a definitive fashion, or with any kind of follow through.   
 
As an example of how to ‘follow through’ in this way, I will refer in 
conclusion to Lars Von Trier’s film The Five Obstructions,16 which is 
a series of violent displacements of the aesthetic integrity of one 
man’s practice into the relations of knowledge and forms of 
identification that structure the discourse of two men, Lars von 
Trier and Jørgen Leth. In The Five Obstructions, truth appears as a 
set of obstructions and constraints that arise from moments of 
identification and misrecognition; practice is reconstructed in the 
image of these identifications and misrecognitions. In the film, Von 
Trier casts himself in the role of the angel of death and the agent of 
causal and traumatic truth, he invites Leth to remake his short film 
The Perfect Human17 five times under specific conditions, which 
include using no edit greater than half a second of film, remaking 
the film in the most miserable place in the world, reconstructing 
The Perfect Human as a cartoon, and, most traumatic of all, the 
threat of remaking the film under conditions of perfect freedom.  
This is what the unity of theory and practice actually means; the 
mutually assured destruction of the relations that have ensured the 
integrity of practice and the neutrality and objectivity of theory and 
analysis. What accomplishes this destruction, paradoxically, is a 
fidelity to the truth of the identifications that bind the practice to its 
analysis in the most intimate and telling ways. While I would not 
                                                 
16 Von Trier, L. The Five Obstructions, 2004. 
17 Leth, J. The Perfect Human, 1967. 
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claim that The Five Obstructions is a piece of practice-led research, 
what Von Trier’s film does offer is a model of how to re-imagine the 
relationship between practice and the analysis of practice, that may 
be useful to those engaged in doctoral and post-doctoral research.  
 
At the beginning of this paper, I referred to one of the roots of 
practice-led research in the Coldstream reforms of the late 1960s, 
with their ambition to introduce a universal, humanities-based, 
university-like and ‘university-lite’ knowledge, with which to unite 
the different cultures of practice within UK art schools. If practice-
led research is to be identified (correctly in my view) as one of the 
outcomes of these reforms, it also exists, paradoxically, as a 
possible solution to the stalemate between universal theories and 
particular practices that the Coldstream reports instituted. In 
practice-led research, both practice and theory can assume a 
degree of particularity and specificity that places them within a 
structure of recognition, identification and mis-identification of the 
kind that Von Trier institutes in The Five Obstructions. In the early 
stages of their projects, researchers in art and design are often 
made keenly aware of how their own identification with particular 
kinds of ostensibly radical theory actually supports the integrity and 
cohesion of their practice, rather than disclosing its truth. If they 
then choose to do something about this state of affairs, they may 
begin to take note of the truth of their identifications and start to 
build them into their research. If this exercise is conducted as a 
simple exercise in self-reflexivity, it does not achieve very much, 
but a deeper investigation into the relationship between (for 
example) the framing of a research question and the simultaneous 
formation of a structure of identification and recognition, could yield 
many benefits. Unfortunately, the current conditions of knowledge 
in the humanities, and the specialisation of academic production 
within the marketplace of ideas, is not conducive to these forms of 
investigation. At the moment, however, practice-led research in art 
and design exists in a unique space between the demands of the 
art market and the marketplace of ideas, where researchers can 
treat theory and practice as elements within a skein of 
knowledge/identification, the investigation of which calls for its own 
methodologies and exemplary texts. In this paper, The Five 
Obstructions is offered as an exemplary text for this kind of 
investigation, while !i"ek, Bourdieu, Eagleton and Jameson 
illustrate the terms of a problem in pursuing this type of research, 
as this presents itself within Humanities-based ‘Theory’. Whether 
practice-led researchers in art and design can create, and then 
adequately translate, their own exemplary texts on the 
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knowledge/identification nexus for the benefit of researchers in the 
Humanities, remains to be seen.   
 
 
